Unappreciative Learning: The Case of Deference

Abstract This chapter examines the merits of deferring to others about ethics and aesthetics; that is, the merits of forming beliefs about moral or aesthetic matters solely because someone else holds those beliefs. While deference is a common and effective means of acquiring knowledge generally, it appears fishy in normative domains, raising a puzzle. Why should an otherwise reliable epistemic method seem problematic when it comes to the normative? The chapter defends moderate optimism, arguing that while normative deference is not epistemically, morally, or aesthetically forbidden, it suffers from a unique defect. It cannot yield appreciative knowledge. Appreciative knowledge involves an affective and practical grasp of normative facts, made possible through acquaintance. Deference, by its nature, fails to acquaint and thus fails to equip agents with reasons to appreciate. However, this epistemic shortcoming does not support a general prohibition against deferring. In rejecting both extreme skepticism and uncritical acceptance of deference, the chapter offers an explanation for why normative deference seems deficient without concluding that it is impermissible. In engaging with more pessimistic views, the chapter argues that appreciative knowledge, rather than understanding-why, is the more crucial epistemic achievement for navigating moral and aesthetic life.