Unappreciative Learning: The Case of Inference

Abstract This chapter extends moderate optimism about indirect methods to the case of inference. While ethicists have focused primarily on deference, aestheticians have long been skeptical of both deference and inference. The chapter is split in two. When it comes to ethics, it concedes that inference, while often epistemically permissible, is defective because it fails to yield appreciative knowledge or understanding-why. It also presents a dilemma for those that think understanding-why is central to moral epistemology. They must either think that a pessimistic view about deference applies to all knowledge-producing methods or they must think that pessimism about deference is false. In aesthetics, the chapter critically engages with longstanding skepticism, about inference. It argues that some forms of inductive aesthetic inference are licit. This sort of inference uses certain generic truths as premises. Despite this partial vindication, the chapter concludes that inference shares a fundamental defect with deference. Both fail to acquaint agents with the normative facts in ways that support appreciation.