Value Fulfillment and the Prudential Good

Abstract Theories of well-being aim to characterize the prudential good, or what is good for someone. One prominent view, inspired by the Ancients, is that a prudentially good life just is a morally good life. Another prominent position, inspired by utilitarian philosophers, is that a good life for a person is a life with more pleasures than pains. A third perspective, with roots in Hobbes, holds that a good life is one in which a person achieves their aims. This chapter describes and explores a view about prudential good that fits most naturally in this third camp. According to the value fulfillment theory, one’s well-being consists in realizing or fulfilling one’s values, which integrate one’s affective, conative, and cognitive attitudes. This makes well-being relative to individuals in the sense that what is good for a person depends on their own valuing attitudes and capacities, not on moral or intrinsic values that transcend the individual.