Normative Relativism

Abstract The relation between metaethical relativism—the thesis that there is more than one true morality—and normative relativism—the thesis that one ought to tolerate or not interfere with people who act on moral beliefs that are fundamentally different from one’s own—is a matter of contention. This chapter argues that metaethical relativism serves as a basis, at least partially, for asserting normative relativism. It argues that one version of metaethical relativism does have such implications because it accepts boundaries on the range of true moralities. Moreover, there are other important and complex relationships between normative views about what one has reason to do, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the reasoning that can lead, if not necessarily, to adoption of metaethical relativism. These normative views can be moral views about what is right and wrong, and they can be normative views about what is epistemically rational.