Against Consequentializing of Normative Theories

Abstract This chapter distinguishes two different arguments for consequentializing alternative normative theories that are often run together, the consequentializing argument for consequentialism and the consequentialist argument for consequentializing. The consequentializing argument for consequentialism deploys ethical premises to support the conclusion that alleged alternatives to consequentialism are better understood as alternative forms of consequentialism. The chapter demonstrates that opponents of consequentialism have developed an impressive array of ethical arguments against this argument. The consequentialist argument for consequentializing, by contrast, deploys premises in the theories of action and mind to support the conclusion that a plausible normative theory must be a form of consequentialism, hence that the most plausible form of any alternative theory will be its nearest consequentialized form. The chapter also demonstrates that because the premises of this argument are claims in the theories of action and mind, effective responses must also come from outside of normative ethics.