Collective Obligations
Abstract
Abstract This chapter discusses obligations falling on collectives or groups of agents, focusing on cases in which obligations fall on the group non-distributively—that is, cases in which the attribution of an obligation to a group does not entail attributions of that very same obligation to group members. The relationship between claims about what groups ought to do and what the individuals that make them up ought to do is a complex matter. In this chapter, particular attention is paid to the relationship between collective obligation and collective agency and to the way in which appeal to the explanatory role of collective obligations can be used to undermine pressure toward reductionist and eliminativist views of these obligations.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Political Philosophy and Ethics
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Publication details
- Pages
- 659–674
- Publication date
- 4 February 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter