Preface

How can a liberal state justify restricting the liberty of specific individuals for the sake of security, and how can it do so in a way that is consistent with respect for the dignity of those whose liberty is restricted? This book seeks to answer that question by distinguishing four different types of justifications for targeted restrictions of liberty, all of which respect the dignity of the individuals restricted. These types of justifications are (1) deserved punishment, (2) forfeiture of rights, (3) enforceable duties to self-restrict, and (4) lack of accountability, which undermines a precondition for claiming liberty rights. My central thesis is that targeted liberty restrictions must appeal to one of these justifications, and that each type of justification imposes characteristic limits on the way restrictions can operate. Targeted liberty restrictions cannot be justified simply by balancing the value of security against the value of liberty. We should be pluralists about what can justify targeted liberty restrictions, but we should be principled pluralists, not sloppy ones. That is, we should recognize and respect the need for justificatory coherence within each type of justification.