In Defense of the Presumption of Law Abidingness

Abstract This chapter defends the presumption of law abidingness (POLA). It starts with an introduction to the concept. It then bolsters its bona fides by listing some leading authorities in criminal law theory and human rights theory who accept it. Section 4.3 lays a firmer foundation for the POLA in the Autonomy Principle and the idea that it connects with negative liberty claims. Section 4.4 handles the objection based on the thought that we should restrict the POLA when we have good reason to believe someone will cause serious harm by acting wrongly. That section raises and responds to the objection first as it arises using existing technology; it then addresses the objection as it arises with possible future technologies, such as chips implanted in the brain that can read what a person will do even before he has formed an intention. It concludes that the POLA, as relied on in the dignity-respecting model of targeted restrictions of liberty, survives unscathed.