The Standing to Blame of an Unjust State

Abstract This chapter examines whether an unjust state retains the standing to blame and, therefore, the standing the punish. It starts by interpreting the standing to blame, in the context of punishment, as the power to call upon convicted wrongdoers to account for their actions and, if found guilty, to own their guilt. Section 10.2 describes three ways the state might lose the standing to blame: hypocrisy, complicity, and non-reciprocity/exclusion. Section 10.3 assesses each of these bases, finding that an unjust state may well lose the standing to blame because of hypocrisy or because it unjustly excludes certain people from participation in civic life. Section 10.4 assesses two responses, and finds both wanting: Tommie Shelby’s idea that the state can punish without condemning, and Antony Duff’s idea that condemning wrongdoers helps to overcome the very injustice that impedes standing to blame. The chapter ends with two further thoughts about how an unjust state might have standing to blame: the importance of avoiding a two-tier system of justice and the obligation of wrongdoers to accept blame for the sake of those who would otherwise be harmed if they don’t. It concludes that these will not rescue the standing to blame in all circumstances, but they substantially help.