Limited Accountability: Intrinsic

Abstract This chapter explores justifications for targeted restrictions on liberty based on limited autonomous capacity. Section 19.1 provides an overview of the chapter. Section 19.2 explains why it is justifiable for the state to impose targeted restrictions on the liberty of those whose autonomous capacity falls far below the threshold for accountability—small children, the insane, and those with severe intellectual disabilities. Section 19.3 addresses the trilemma that arises for those with borderline autonomous capacity: Hold them accountable as if they had full autonomous capacity, give them normal liberties but also hold them less accountable than those with full autonomous capacity, or impose targeted restrictions on their liberty. Section 19.4 addresses an issue for insanity: Can it be defined in part by difficulties of self-control? It argues in the affirmative. Section 19.5 applies that point to drug addiction. Section 19.6 deals with psychopaths, especially those who may have prudential abilities but lack moral understanding—it argues that they should be held accountable with a version of criminal punishment that collects their guilt-debt but does not (pointlessly) censure them. And Section 19.7 explains why compensation is generally not owed for loss of liberty due to intrinsic lack of accountability, but why there are some exceptions.