Limited Accountability: Extrinsic

Abstract This chapter explores how and why extrinsic lack of accountability can license targeted restrictions of liberty. Section 20.1 explains how extrinsic lack of accountability can justify targeted restrictions of liberty. Section 20.2 explores what limited extrinsic accountability means in terms of either the state’s limited duty to provide policing to hold certain people accountable, or the state’s limited ability to provide adequate policing. Section 20.3 explores four examples of extrinsic lack of accountability: prisoners of war, alien suspected terrorists, other deportable aliens who cannot be deported, and frightening people in times of invasion or insurrection. Section 20.4 discusses why compensation is generally not owed to those restricted under the heading of extrinsic lack of accountability, noting the marginal cases in which compensation might be owed. And Section 20.5 deals with two cases that might be thought to show that the dignity-respecting model (DR Model) for targeted restrictions of liberty cannot handle all security problems that might arise. The first concerns someone who is likely to become a terrorist, although she is not one now; the second concerns someone with the power to corrupt the institutions of law enforcement, someone for whom it might be tempting to engage in pretextual prosecution. This section argues that the DR Model for targeted restrictions of liberty can provide a plausible framework for handling both kinds of cases.