In Defense of Ontic Austerity for Belief

Abstract This chapter defends a biological account of belief according to which what is necessary to it is its motivational role, demoting the relationship between belief and truth to a contingent one secured by the biological circumstances of believers. It is argued that this account of belief is better able to illuminate various phenomena associated with belief and its formation than accounts which assign to belief a thicker ontic character and a stronger relationship to truth. Specifically, the account is able to properly delineate belief, that is, to capture all beliefs as beliefs. It is unifying. But it is also able to explain some edge cases of belief (specifically, religious belief and self-deceptive belief). It is explanatory. Finally, in its being ontically austere, it is parsimonious, eschewing the need for appeals to new categories to accommodate edge cases, which arise from too strict a conception of belief’s ontic character.