Translucent Beliefs
Abstract
Abstract Some of our mental states are translucent: We can’t fully elaborate some parts of their content. More generally, mental states come on a spectrum when it comes to whether and how much we can elaborate some parts of their content. This chapter illustrates the concept of translucency with the help of the contrast between imagination and supposition and then applies it to beliefs. It is argued that the translucency of beliefs is especially important as it draws attention to the role of mental imagery in our belief economy. This claim has some big picture implications for the alleged distinction between imagistic and propositional representations and for the ethics of translucent beliefs.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Publication details
- Journal / source
- The Nature of Belief
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York, NY
- Pages
- 264–285
- Publication date
- 27 February 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter