Strange Languages of the Self (2)

Abstract This chapter examines whether any criteria, other than the ability to express de se beliefs, can determine a language’s suitability for rational beings. It begins by analyzing Reid’s critique of ordinary identity claims and the suggestion that “No-Tree” or “No-Self” languages might be theoretically superior though pragmatically inconvenient, and it introduces the Equivalence Principle, which holds that equivalent languages are nearly equally good. The chapter critiques “pseudo-pragmatic” arguments and shows that appeals to convenience, salience, or brevity fail to establish that ordinary language is more rational than alternatives such as No-Tree, No-Self, or even Disjunction languages. It evaluates Lewis’s and Sider’s claims that languages are better when they employ natural, joint-carving, or fundamental terms, ultimately questioning whether such a “Value Claim” can be defended beyond intuition. Finally, the chapter concludes that if languages are equivalent and capable of sustaining rational agency, no strong reason exists to regard one as better, and ordinary talk of personal identity may be as good as language can get.