Conceptual Ignorance

Abstract The previous chapter argued in favour of epistemic normative constraints on conceptual engineering. This chapter unpacks these epistemic limits further in terms of conceptual ignorance: an engineering project generates representational loss just in case it carries a disposition to increase one’s degree of conceptual ignorance. In turn, we understand C-conceptual ignorance as knowledge of what a C is. We argue that a subject S’s conceptual ignorance of C is directly proportional to the number of possible answers to ‘What is a c?’ that S needs to properly eliminate: the closer a subject S approximates a complete answer to the question, the lower the degree of ignorance of S with regard to C. The relevant sense of possibility has to do with close metaphysical, epistemic, and doxastic possibility. In turn, outright attributions of conceptual ignorance to S are context-sensitive—they have to do with whether S surpasses a threshold of open answers to the question ‘What is a c?’ determined by the relevant contextual contrast class.