Spinoza on the Notion of a Human Form

Abstract This chapter addresses the question of a shared human nature in Spinoza’s writings by investigating the role of ‘form’. It claims that this notion functions in a similar way to substantial forms, insofar as it is related to preservation of life, specificity of affects, and individual perfection. However, its role in the Ethics, it is further argued, is not one of explication, but rather one of limitation. ‘Form’ is introduced to capture the impossibility of transformation and to set boundaries akin to species notions. Therefore, ‘form’ provides Spinoza with the resources to maintain metaphysical gradualism while restricting changes in kind and to specify a standard that accounts for his claims of agreement between human individuals and differing perfections. Thus, ‘form’ captures fundamental aspects of human life: the distinction between humans and other kinds of individuals, the specificity of human experience, and the greater perfection of one human being compared to another.