Epistemic Authority: A Very Brief Systematic Survey of Its History

Abstract This chapter explains—under the label “epistemic authority”—how expert testimony has been assessed throughout the history of philosophy. It is argued that the dominant Total Evidence View dates back to Aristotle and was endorsed by most defenders of the argument from authority in medieval philosophy. Proponents of arguments from authority have typically assigned some but not absolute weight to the claims of experts. Interestingly, it turns out that there were a few defenders of the Preemption View long before its current proponents, Raz and Zagzebski, entered the stage. In the thirteenth century, William of Sherwood claimed that expert testimony constitutes conclusive evidence. Conclusive evidence is infallible, indefeasible, and justifies a maximal strength of belief. It therefore rules out further evidence from being rationally relevant. Given that human experts are fallible, it is, however, hard to believe that expert testimony provides conclusive evidence. Later on, Hans-Georg Gadamer argued that even fallible and defeasible expert testimony can replace the judgments of laypeople. He is another, so-far unnoticed predecessor of the Preemption View that became popular through the work of Joseph Raz and Linda Zagzebski.