The Rise and Fall of ‘Counterinsurgency’

Abstract This chapter outlines the fashion lifecycle of the counterinsurgency concept from 2004 to 2014. The chapter starts by outlining earlier conceptions of counterinsurgency to show that the version institutionalized in 2006 offered a very specific interpretation that combined a problem definition and solution to produce a promising narrative. This conceptualization centred on a few axioms, including the idea that counterinsurgency fundamentally differed from conventional war, but had a rich tradition. This exceptionalization served as explanation for previous failures in the ongoing wars and recipe to win them, and for academics provided ample opportunity to publish. Academics often bandwagoned on the concept, reproducing its dominant, promising narrative. When failures in Afghanistan led the Obama administration to drop the term from official discourse, academic interest declined too and perspectives on counterinsurgency changed remarkably. This chapter also discusses different strands of the academic literature to show the dynamics of an academic debate unfolding.