All the Things I Do Not Know and Refuse to Learn
Abstract
Abstract We are ignorant of many things. Most of the time, that ignorance seems epistemically neutral. At other times it seems like a ground for epistemic criticism. The permissibility problem is the problem of explaining why some cases of ignorance are epistemically criticisable whilst others are not. In this chapter, Munton argues that the standard resources of epistemology, both internalist and externalist, are poorly placed to capture our evaluative practices around ignorance and solve the permissibility problem. By contrast, thinking in terms of the attentional dispositions which underwrite problematically resilient forms of ignorance can more satisfactorily ground the evaluative resources we need.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Free Will and Agency
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Oxford Studies in Epistemology
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Pages
- 187–213
- Publication date
- 9 January 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter