Phasalism

Abstract In this chapter, the author discusses a handful of preliminaries and then traces a path by which philosophers with certain sensibilities might arrive at the conclusion that phasalism is true. The author starts with some introductory remarks about his approach to metaphysics, and then some remarks about the key metaphysical ideas he needs in order to formulate his theory: sortal properties, the material objects that instantiate sortal properties, and the sortal changes those objects undergo. Then the author states official definitions of his view, phasalism, and its rival, substantialism. He also elaborates on some of the notable features of these views and briefly discuss their standing in the literature. Finally, he provides some initial motivation for phasalism by showing how someone might arrive at phasalism from two independently motivated theories in material object metaphysics: the endurantist theory of persistence and the monist theory of material coincidence. This discussion also gives the author an opportunity to highlight some of the most important virtues of the phasalist account of sortal changes.