Metaphysical Determination, Analysis, and Systematicity

Abstract Can the ideology of ‘metaphysical determination’ and ‘grounding’ be fruitfully employed as the basis of a systematic account of reality? We argue it cannot because ‘metaphysical determines’ and ‘grounds’ lack determinate application criteria. In particular, they aren’t invested with determinate application criteria ‘from below’, from the ways in which they are employed in ordinary language—because, we argue, they’re not a feature of ordinary language. Nor are they invested with determinate application criteria ‘from above’, from the ways that they are employed in metaphysical theorizing—because, we argue, they fail to occupy a determinate or distinctive theoretical role. We propose instead a return to the project of systematic, logical, and conceptual analysis, defending the project of analysis against the scepticism of philosophers in thrall to the ideology of metaphysical determination and grounding.