Against Inferential Pollution: A Critique of the Adoption Problem in Logic

Abstract In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that the logic one uses is always under one’s rational control. According to its proponents, some fundamental logical principles, such as modus ponens, cannot begin to be used by a reasoner who does not already use them. The standard explanation is that these principles are ‘self-governing’ and hence unadoptable; this serves as an argument for the exceptional epistemic and cognitive status of fundamental logical principles. I argue, however, that this interpretation is flawed. The account of adoption proposed by Birman (2024) relies on an incorrect assumption about the relationship between logical adoption and logical inference, and this assumption makes the adoption of all logical principles impossible, even if they are not self-governing. The Adoption Problem is therefore not convincing, at least not in its original form.