Conservation auctions: An online double constraint reverse auction experiment
Abstract
Abstract Conservation auctions are designed to allocate payments for environmental services to voluntary farmers. The auctioneer may announce either the maximum number of contracts (target-constrained auction) or, more commonly, the total budget available (budget-constrained auction). Building on previous work that compared these two formats, we introduce a new double-constraint auction, where both constraints—set at the same levels as in the benchmarks—are simultaneously disclosed to participants. Using the same experimental methodology, we assess performance consistent with a generic policy objective: maximizing environmental benefits while minimizing expenditures. On average, the double-constraint auction outperforms both target- and budget-constrained formats.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Auction Theory and Applications
Economic and Environmental Valuation
Art History and Market Analysis
Publication details
- Journal / source
- European Review of Agricultural Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 581–602
- Publication date
- 17 January 2026
- Language
- EN