Deflating Mental Representation , by Frances Egan
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Since its onset, cognitive science has largely relied on the assumption that understanding cognitive capacities requires postulating mental representations and computational operations over them. As a result, these concepts have been classic topics for philosophical reflection, although the focal questions, background assumptions and dialectical positions have inevitably evolved. In that respect, Egan’s philosophical contributions over recent decades have played a decisive role in transforming and shaping the current form of the debate. Her latest book, derived from the 2021 Jean Nicod lectures given in Paris, resumes and expands this research project by presenting her view in a new light, responding to old and new critics and developing her views in original directions. Egan aims to develop a plausible and coherent framework for addressing some of the most pressing problems currently discussed in the relevant literature: Should we adopt a realist attitude towards representational models in cognitive science? Can mental content be naturalized? How should we interpret mental attributions in commonsense psychology? Can representationalism account for perceptual experience? Mainstream positions embrace full-blown realism and hold that mental representations can eventually be naturalized, in the sense of being fully explained in non-semantic and non-intentional terms by appealing to properties and relations such as causation, function, and the like. Egan has developed a solid alternative project, which she calls deflationism, which among other things opposes robust realism and the naturalization of intentionality, as it is usually understood. Here I will briefly present and engage with this suggestive and thought-provoking position.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Embodied and Extended Cognition
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Mind
- Publication date
- 28 March 2026
- Language
- EN