Expressivity in and Before Language

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Authors: Dorit Bar‐On
Cited by: 0
References: 71

Abstract

Abstract This chapter concerns the nature of the expression relation. Section 6.1 reviews two philosophical puzzles—one concerning the origins of meaning, the other concerning “first person authority”—and well-known “expressivist” attempts to address them. Section 6.2 sketches the neo-expressivist view of expression and expressive behavior. Section 6.3 explains how neo-expressivism captures both differences and similarities between expressive communication before and after language and provides more viable solutions to the puzzles, through its appeal to the idea that expressive behavior—whether linguistic or non-linguistic—is designed to show (or display) expressers’ mental states. Section 6.4 explains how the idea of expressing-as-showing can apply to the use of linguistic expressives. Section 6.5 questions whether “use-conditional” accounts of linguistic expressivity have the resources to address the two puzzles. It also argues that such accounts do not adequately capture the distinction between descriptive vs. expressive uses of language.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Syntax Semantics Linguistic Variation Philosophy and Theoretical Science Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

Publication details

Journal / source
Oxford University Press eBooks
Pages
108–136
Publication date
27 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter