Subsidiary Financing: Risk Shifting as a Commitment Device

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Authors: Gyöngyi Lóránth, Alan D. Morrison, Jing Zeng
Cited by: 0
References: 30

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Abstract

Abstract We study how firms can design their organizational structures to overcome dynamic commitment problems when entering new markets. A manager exerts costly effort to first develop and subsequently manage an investment opportunity. Ex post, the firm underinvests in projects that generate high management rents. However, the prospect of those rents helps offset the manager’s initial project development cost, making ex ante commitment to invest optimal. Levered subsidiaries mitigate this time-consistency problem by introducing risk-shifting incentives that counteract underinvestment. Subsidiaries are most valuable for projects that are costly to develop, have moderate management costs, and yield returns uncorrelated with existing business. (JEL G32, G34, L22)

Fields of Study & Subjects

Corporate Finance and Governance Capital Investment and Risk Analysis Private Equity and Venture Capital

Publication details

Journal / source
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN