Non-participant externalities reshape the evolution of altruistic punishment

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Authors: Zhao Song, Chen Shen, Valerio Capraro, T. A. Han
Cited by: 4
References: 42

Abstract

Understanding the evolutionary origins of altruistic punishment, a critical mechanism sustaining cooperation, remains a central challenge in behavioural science. Voluntary participation is considered a powerful approach that enables its emergence, but its explanatory power typically rests on the common assumption that non-participants have no impact on the public good. Yet, given the decentralized nature of voluntary participation, opting out does not necessarily preclude individuals from influencing the public good. Here, we revisit the role of voluntary participation by allowing non-participants to exert either positive or negative impacts on the public good. Using evolutionary analysis in a well-mixed finite population, we find that positive externalities from non-participants lower the synergy threshold required for altruistic punishment to dominate. In contrast, negative externalities raise this threshold, making altruistic punishment harder to sustain. Notably, when non-participants have positive impacts, altruistic punishment thrives only if non-participation is incentivized, whereas under negative impacts, it can persist even when non-participation is discouraged. Our findings reveal that efforts to promote altruistic punishment must account for the active role of non-participants, whose influence can make or break collective outcomes.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Publication details

Journal / source
Journal of The Royal Society Interface
Publisher
The Royal Society
Volume
23
Issue
235
Publication date
18 February 2026
Language
EN