An evolutionary game theoretic framework for construction robotics adoption policy coordination and innovation dynamics

Purpose This study explores the adoption of construction robotics by modeling the strategic interactions among government bodies, construction firms and technology suppliers. It aims to identify how dynamic incentives, market forces and innovation collectively shape adoption behavior and system evolution. Design/methodology/approach An evolutionary game-theoretic model is developed to capture the bounded rationality and feedback mechanisms among the three stakeholders. A dynamic incentive mechanism is introduced to simulate strategy adjustments across different development stages. Findings Simulation results reveal that government subsidies are critical in the early phase but gradually lose effectiveness. As market maturity increases, contractor adoption and supplier innovation become dominant drivers. Excessive incentives may lead to instability, highlighting the need for balanced policy design. Originality/value This research contributes a stage-responsive framework that integrates policy tools, enterprise behavior and innovation dynamics. It provides practical guidance for formulating adaptive incentive strategies to support the sustainable diffusion of robotics in construction.