Governing food rescue in emerging economies: a tax credit incentive framework for edible-surplus redistribution in Indonesia

Purpose This study examines why food rescue systems in emerging economies fail to scale despite formal policy interest and develops a tax credit incentive framework for verifiable edible-surplus redistribution in Indonesia, using Bandung as the empirical context. Design/methodology/approach The study combines business process mapping, policy review and semi-structured interviews to analyze the food rescue workflow in Bandung. The resulting governance design was instantiated as a blockchain-based prototype and evaluated through functional testing, a scenario-based usability survey of 50 stakeholders and comparative benchmarking. Findings Analysis of the mapped workflow identifies three structural coordination barriers: enterprises treat disposal as an operational default rather than a residual outcome, food banks face dual instability in donation supply and operational capacity, and government policy recognition remains disconnected from fiscal implementation. These barriers suggest a common coordination gap: the absence of a mechanism that links enterprise incentives, food-bank capacity and government-recognized contribution records. The study specifies four design requirements under which a tax-credit incentive could support this alignment, while prototype results provide initial evidence that its verification, liquidity and certification requirements are technically feasible under simulated conditions. Originality/value The study contributes to the food rescue governance literature by specifying the conditions under which tax-credit incentives may support alignment among enterprises, food banks and government in emerging economies, and by showing through a working prototype that the proposed framework's verification, liquidity and certification requirements can be technically operationalized at low cost under simulated conditions.