The effect of managerial ownership on corporate carbon performance

Purpose This study aims to examine the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate carbon performance using a sample of A-share listed industrial firms from 2007 to 2022. It explores the internal mechanisms through which managerial ownership influences carbon performance and identifies contextual factors that shape this relationship. The research contributes to the literature on corporate governance and sustainable development by offering empirical evidence on how ownership structure affects environmental outcomes. Design/methodology/approach An empirical approach was adopted using a panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms. The study investigates the relationship between managerial ownership and carbon performance through econometric models and a series of robustness checks, including alternative variable specifications and an instrumental variable approach. Mechanism analyses examine Type I and Type II agency costs as mediators, while subgroup analyses assess the moderating effects of analyst attention and state ownership. Findings The results indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and corporate carbon performance, suggesting that moderate levels of ownership are associated with better performance, while very low or high levels are less effective. Mechanism analyses confirm that Type I and Type II agency costs mediate this relationship. The inverted U-shaped effect is more pronounced in firms with low analyst attention and in state-owned enterprises, highlighting the influence of external monitoring and ownership structure. Originality/value This study provides empirical evidence on the impact of managerial ownership on corporate carbon performance, highlighting both its underlying mechanisms and contextual factors. It contributes to the literature by linking corporate governance with environmental outcomes and offers practical insights for policymakers and business leaders. The findings emphasize the need to optimize governance structures to align managerial incentives with sustainability goals.