Architecture and Power-Balancing Effects on Side-Channel Leakage Protection in AES Hardware Implementations

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Authors: Valery D. Alekseev, Alexander S. Tishin, Victor Y. Mikhailov
Cited by: 0
References: 6

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Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of architectural decisions and power-balancing methods on protection against power side-channel leaks in hardware implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic block. We analyze AES implementations with bit widths of 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128 bits, including a baseline version and three power-balancing side-channel protection techniques: XOR-based inversion, S-box inversion, and enhanced S-box inversion. The study evaluates architectures combining XOR and S-box operations in a single cycle, as well as a pipelined implementation with parallel XOR and S-box operations. Security assessment is conducted using correlation power analysis (CPA) and the Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) methodology, based on 10,000 traces for each configuration, to identify optimal solutions for minimizing side-channel leakage.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Cryptographic Implementations and Security Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic Coding theory and cryptography

Publication details

Pages
148–153
Publication date
3 February 2026
Language
EN