Hardening Rust's Result: Simple Source Code Transformations for Fault-Robust Bootloader

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Authors: Minjae Kim, Eunsung Lee, Jaeyong Lee
Cited by: 0
References: 11

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Abstract

While Rust is increasingly adopted in secure firmware for its compile time guarantees, its core error-handling type, Result, remains vulnerable to runtime physical Fault Injection Attacks (FIAs). We demonstrate that a Single Bit-Flip (SBF) attack on the Result's runtime tag bit can transmute a failure (Err) into a success (Ok), creating a critical vulnerability that can bypass Secure Boot.To mitigate this threat, we propose a low overhead, source-level technique. We introduce RobustResult, which replaces the standard Result. This new type employs 32-bit complementary magic values (selected for maximum Hamming Distance) as its tags. This design ensures that an SBF attack corrupts the tag into an invalid, detectable third state rather than silently flipping Err to Ok. The solution is completed by a match_robust() macro that verifies tag integrity before matching.Experimental validation on a Cortex-M35p platform confirmed that our technique successfully detects and defends against tag bit-flip attacks, unlike the standard Result. We also analyzed the codesize overhead, demonstrating that it is modest and scales proportionally with the number of unique concrete types, a predictable result of Rust's monomorphization.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Security and Verification in Computing Cryptographic Implementations and Security Logic programming and type systems

Publication details

Journal / source
International Conference on Consumer Electronics
Pages
1–5
Publication date
3 February 2026
Language
EN