Hardening Rust's Result: Simple Source Code Transformations for Fault-Robust Bootloader
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While Rust is increasingly adopted in secure firmware for its compile time guarantees, its core error-handling type, Result, remains vulnerable to runtime physical Fault Injection Attacks (FIAs). We demonstrate that a Single Bit-Flip (SBF) attack on the Result's runtime tag bit can transmute a failure (Err) into a success (Ok), creating a critical vulnerability that can bypass Secure Boot.To mitigate this threat, we propose a low overhead, source-level technique. We introduce RobustResult, which replaces the standard Result. This new type employs 32-bit complementary magic values (selected for maximum Hamming Distance) as its tags. This design ensures that an SBF attack corrupts the tag into an invalid, detectable third state rather than silently flipping Err to Ok. The solution is completed by a match_robust() macro that verifies tag integrity before matching.Experimental validation on a Cortex-M35p platform confirmed that our technique successfully detects and defends against tag bit-flip attacks, unlike the standard Result. We also analyzed the codesize overhead, demonstrating that it is modest and scales proportionally with the number of unique concrete types, a predictable result of Rust's monomorphization.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Security and Verification in Computing
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
Logic
programming
and type systems
Publication details
- Journal / source
- International Conference on Consumer Electronics
- Pages
- 1–5
- Publication date
- 3 February 2026
- Language
- EN