Preserving Runtime Control-Flow Integrity Transparently Through Hardware-Based Stack Confidentiality and Integrity on RISC-V IoT Devices

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Authors: Weike Wang, Bingzheng Li, Xiaolei Wang, Rikang Zhao, Senyang Li, Xiang Wang, Juin Jei Liou
Cited by: 1
References: 43

Abstract

RISC-V devices are widely used in diverse IoT applications, where security is critical. Control flow hijacking attacks can circumvent existing security mechanisms to transfer the program control flow to harmful gadget chains arranged by adversaries, which are primarily initiated by tampering with the data frame and return address within the stack. In this work, we present a microarchitecture-level, hardware-assisted, lightweight scheme for encrypting and verifying stack integrity, thereby transparently enforcing runtime control-flow integrity. The encrypted stack hinders attackers’ analysis and increases the difficulty of assembling malicious gadgets. Stack integrity verification enables the system to detect malicious actions that tamper with return addresses and crucial registers at runtime. We implement the system on an Xilinx XC7K325T FPGA with the T-head Xuantie E906 RISC-V core. The experimental results show that, with a 16KB D-Cache across the ten selected benchmark sets, this work incurs an average performance overhead of 4.89%. At the same time, the CoreMark score decreases by merely 0.10%. The area introduced by the proposed hardware is 10.01% of the total SoC under SAED 32nm Technology.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Security and Verification in Computing Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security Advanced Malware Detection Techniques

Publication details

Journal / source
IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Volume
13
Issue
13
Pages
29049–29064
Publication date
20 April 2026