Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory Aliasing
Abstract
Confidential computing, powered by trusted execution environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX/TDX and AMD SEV-SNP, is now widely available from major cloud providers. At the core of these technologies is hardware-level memory encryption to protect against privileged attackers and physical threats such as bus snooping and cold boot attacks. Recent extensions add access-control checks to defend against software-based ciphertext manipulation and aliasing attacks. In this work, we challenge the protection modern memory encryption technologies offer against physical adversaries by building a low-cost ($
Fields of Study & Subjects
Security and Verification in Computing
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
Publication details
- Journal / source
- 2026 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Pages
- 4391–4407
- Publication date
- 18 May 2026
- Language
- EN