Dynamic Positioning for Switched LPV Model of NUSV Based on Dual-Channel Attack Detection-Compensation Mechanism

This paper explores the secure dynamic positioning problem under bidirectional deception attacks based on the newly proposed switched networked unmanned surface vessel (NUSV) model. A switched linear parameter-varying (LPV) model, accounting for mass variations due to changes in shipborne equipment, is established to characterize the NUSV dynamics. To counter bidirectional network attacks, a dual-channel deception attack defense mechanism is proposed. For the vessel-to-basal communication channel, the mechanism employs a controller mode estimator to provide reliable controller modes when data tampering is detected, thereby mitigating the duration of asynchronous behavior induced by deception attacks (DAs). For the basal-to-vessel channel, a quantity-parameter-based control input compensator is designed to counteract the impact of DAs on secure controller outputs. Based on this framework, a secure control scheme is developed to achieve robust dynamic positioning for NUSV. Finally, a numerical simulation is conducted to validate the efficacy of the proposed approach.