Security Weaknesses of a Lightweight Privacy-Preserving Edge Computing Based Ciphertext Retrieval Scheme
Abstract
Most recently, Wang et al. proposed (in IEEE TCC, doi: 10.1109/TCC.2024.3461732) a lightweight privacy-preserving ciphertext retrieval scheme based on edge computing (termed as LPCR) by combining ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption and searchable encryption techniques. The authors claimed that LPCR can achieve the security of chosen plaintext attack (CPA) and chosen keyword attack (CKA), and resist collusion attack. However, by presenting a concrete plaintext recovery attack (PRA), we demonstrate that every decryption key has the ability to decrypt any user's ciphertext and get the plaintext document encrypted in it. Next, using PRA, we illustrate that LPCR is vulnerable to CPA, CKA and collusion attacks.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Cryptography and Data Security
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
Publication details
- Journal / source
- IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing
- Publisher
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 391–392
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026