The Catfish Effect in Quality Information Disclosure Strategies Under Blockchain Traceability

Retailers are increasingly adopting blockchain technology to disclose product quality information. However, designing effective information disclosure strategies remains a key challenge for information engineering managers in retail enterprises. This paper develops a supplier–retailer supply chain model to compare two blockchain-based strategies: “pure traceability strategy” and “partial traceability strategy”. The results show that under the partial traceability strategy, normal products stimulate demand for traceable products through the “catfish effect”, leading retailer to prefer this strategy. This strategy also generates higher consumer surplus and can achieve a triple-win outcome for the retailer, supplier, and consumers under certain conditions. In the extended analysis, we introduce “non-traceability” strategy to compare all three strategies and examine consumer segmentation scenario for robustness testing. The findings indicate that either the non-traceability or partial traceability strategy may become the retailer's optimal choice. Due to the “seesaw effect”, supplier profits remain the same under both the partial and non-traceability strategies. Furthermore, the extended analysis confirms that the partial traceability strategy consistently delivers a triple-win outcome, remains optimal for consumers, and continues to outperform the pure traceability strategy for the retailer. This study provides strategic and theoretical guidance for information engineering managers responsible for blockchain implementation in retail enterprises.