A Lightweight Blockchain-Assisted Certificateless Cloud Data Integrity Auditing Scheme Without Third-Party Auditor
Abstract
Data Integrity Auditing (DIA) enables users to remotely verify whether their data saved in third-party clouds has been maliciously tampered with or compromised. As an extension of DIA in certificateless cryptography, certificateless DIA (CL-DIA) integrates the merits of conventional public-key cryptography (no key escrow) and identity-based cryptography (no certificates). However, CL-DIA schemes depend on a reliable third-party auditor (TPA) to perform integrity audits, inevitably suffering from performance bottleneck and single-point failure problems. Moreover, almost all current CL-DIA schemes were designed with computationally expensive bilinear pairings. Cryptanalysis demonstrates that the existing unique pairing-free CL-DIA scheme fails to achieve the unforgeable security of auditing proofs. In this work, we put forward a lightweight blockchain-assisted CL-DIA scheme. The scheme achieves DIA through the blockchain instead of a single TPA, thereby overcoming the problems caused by the TPA-based centralized auditing model. Then, by avoiding time-consuming pairing operations and employing edge servers in generating verifiable tags for the uploaded data of users, its performance surpasses previous pairing-based CL-DIA schemes, particularly in terms of computation efficiency. Furthermore, we provide formal proofs in the random oracle model demonstrating that our scheme achieves unforgeability of verifiable tags and auditing proofs, ensures data privacy secrity, and is resistant to collusion attacks between the EN and the CSP. Finally, experimental results show that when auditing 25 file blocks, our scheme only costs 0.29s, which reduces the total time cost of integrity auditing phase by 48.2%-85.5% compared to current pairing-based CL-DIA schemes.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Cloud Data Security Solutions
Cryptography and Data Security
Big Data and Digital Economy
Publication details
- Journal / source
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Publisher
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Volume
- 21
- Pages
- 976–991
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026