SRAA: A Secure and Revocable Access Authentication Scheme in Cross-Domain Vehicular Twin Networks

Vehicular twin networks (VTN) create virtual agents of vehicular entities through digital twin (DT) technology, replacing physical counterparts in connecting and exchanging traffic information in cyberspace, overcoming physical range constraints and extending information sources for enhanced vehicular decision support. However, the inherent openness of VTN renders communication between DTs, vulnerable to security threats, such as tampering and impersonation, especially in scenarios where DTs are distributed across multiple cloud domains. These issues result in erroneous decisions to threaten vehicular safety because DTs may receive compromised information. To address these challenges, this article proposes a secure and revocable access authentication scheme in the cross-domain VTN. In the scheme, DTs should be authorized first to obtain identity-bound symmetric functions before joining the VTN, and then perform secure access authentication and key agreement with others based on chameleon hash functions for both intradomain and cross-domain communication. Moreover, a dynamic revocation mechanism is introduced to remove malicious DTs from VTN. Formal verification using the Tamarin tool demonstrates that the proposed scheme achieves diverse security properties. Performance evaluation further shows that the proposed scheme outperforms most related schemes in terms of computational and communication overhead.