Analysis of GNSS Asynchronous Spoofing Pull-In Rate for Security Testing of Static Receiver

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Authors: Yili Song, Xin Yang, Jingyue Luo, Wenxiang Liu, Wei Dong Xiao, Ming Ma, Guangfu Sun
Cited by: 0
References: 24

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Abstract

With the widespread application of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), the security testing of critical infrastructure against GNSS spoofing attacks has become a crucial research topic. Among these attacks, asynchronous spoofing can seamlessly infiltrate receivers and take control of their loops. However, existing studies lack comprehensive analysis on the pullin rate threshold of such attacks. In this study, by analyzing asynchronous spoofing scenarios and their impact on loop mechanisms, we establish an analytical model that summarizes the pull-in rate threshold of spoofing in typical loop structures. Through software receiver simulations, the effect of spoofing interference on typical code loop structures is demonstrated, leading to the determination of the pull-in rate threshold for asynchronous spoofing signals. We systematically analyze the influence of code loop order, loop bandwidth, and damping factor on the spoofing speed limit. The results show that increasing loop bandwidth and power gain significantly enhance the spoofing speed limit, while the damping factor and loop order regulate the speed limit by affecting system stability and dynamic tracking performance. This study offers critical insights and tools for enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructures against future navigation spoofing attacks.

Fields of Study & Subjects

GNSS positioning and interference Inertial Sensor and Navigation Smart Grid Security and Resilience

Publication details

Journal / source
IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement
Volume
75
Pages
1–17
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN