Hard and Soft Neo‐Mercantilism and the Politics of Resource Security in the Age of Geoeconomic Rivalry

ABSTRACT As supply chains become weaponized in the context of intensifying geoeconomic rivalry, why do similarly exposed industrialized states adopt divergent strategies toward strategic resource dependence? This article examines how the United States and Japan, both reliant on Chinese rare earth elements (REE), respond differently to China's dominance in this sector. We argue that variation in state responses stems from differences in securitization and state–private sector interaction. The United States pursues a relatively hard neo‐mercantilist strategy, characterized by nationalizing supply chains and treating REE access as a security imperative. In contrast, Japan adopts a soft neo‐mercantilist approach, relying on public–private coordination and market‐based diversification. We reconceptualize resource security by introducing a typology of neo‐mercantilist strategies and show how institutional configurations mediate states' responses to coercive economic dependencies. The article contributes to the literature on geoeconomics and international political economy by illuminating how states adapt to the strategic instrumentalisation of technology.