Wittgenstein On Moral Certainty

ABSTRACT Moral certainty is a growing research area in philosophy with implications for current debates on hinge epistemology, moral change and deep moral disagreements. Despite several distinctive lines of disagreement, two assumptions are shared in the current discussion of moral certainty. The first is the acknowledgement of Wittgenstein's work On Certainty as the main source of inspiration. The second is the understanding that Wittgenstein's later writings do not feature any work on the topic of moral certainty. In this article, we challenge the latter standard assumption. We show that Wittgenstein did consider examples of moral certainty and can also be said to have a conception of moral certainty in his later writings. This paves the way for future scholars to turn to Wittgenstein's writings not only as a source of inspiration for work on moral certainty, but also as a direct source of insight into this specific topic.