Small, Medium, Large: How Government Made the US Into a Manufacturing Powerhouse. By Colleen A.Dunlavy, Cambridge: Polity, 2024. 240 pp. $29.95 (hardcover). ISBN‐13 : 978‐1‐50‐956173‐5
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The famous influencer John Maynard Keynes once tweeted (no link, sorry) that dead economists' memes live rent free in policymakers' heads. Likewise, the memes of early analysts dominate discussion of some social and economic phenomena to the detriment of a complete causal understanding of those phenomena. Assembly lines, semi-skilled workers, and the Keynesian welfare state are memetic in discussions of Fordism—and correctly so. But this occludes a full understanding. We can roughly slot how Fordism is discussed in political science into the usual two-by-two table, distinguishing on one axis between private sector and state authority and on the other between macro- and micro-economic interventions. The usual memes fall neatly on one diagonal, with firms and unions occupying the micro-economic, private box and the welfare state and monetary and fiscal policy the public, macro-economic box. But the other two boxes remain relatively unstudied. Enter Colleen Dunlavy's short, crisply written book that fills in how “state-side, microeconomic” intervention enabled continuous flow assembly line mass production, while denaturing a considerable amount of our daily “taken-for-givenness.” Without sophisticated logistics, continuous flow production is impossible; without standardization, sophisticated logistics is impossible. Ford's scale of production permitted it to standardize locally. For example, Ford's logistics chief Charles Sorensen specified dimensions of wooden shipping boxes from component suppliers such that they could be disassembled and used as floorboards in the Model-T. But on one hand most firms lacked Ford's market power, on the other firms often benefited from product differentiation that permitted competition on criteria other than price, and on the third (a non-standard product!) Ford's internal dimensional standards did not necessarily match those of his competitors. So how did America (and eventually the world) end up with “small, medium, large” in items ranging from consumer toilet paper to the standard industrial 2″×4″×8′ framing stud, thus enabling a more rapid and thorough diffusion of mass production to sectors outside autos and to firms in the small and medium category? The usual answer is spontaneous micro-economic, private sector emulation of Ford. By contrast, Dunlavy shows that the US state actively promoted and sometimes forced product size standardization across the entire economy. Before World War 1, product sizes in any given sector varied wildly from firm to firm. In 1919, for example, 900 bed manufacturers offered mattresses in 78 distinct sizes, rather than the four standard widths and essentially one standard length that prevail today. This in turn enabled standardization of blankets, bedsheets, etc. Multiply this variety across every bit of the consumer economy and many production inputs (like agricultural equipment) and the difficulty in attaining mass production and consumption becomes evident. America's brief participation in World War 1 catalyzed a government effort at standardization to free up manpower for the military and conserve on resource use. Standardization reduced the need for workers to fiddle around fitting things together and, more importantly, eliminated considerable managerial and distribution work. Standardization also conserved on materials by reducing waste through simplified design. The War Industries Board (WIB) first used persuasion and then, after legislation in 1918, its ability to prioritize access to resources to force firms to negotiate standards inside their trade associations. In doing so, the WIB generated a mixture of temporary and permanent social changes. On the permanent side, efforts to conserve on the use of wool led the US government to enlist the French government to induce Parisian designers to displace more ornate designs in favor of fabric conserving slim silhouette designs for women's clothing, culminating in Chanel's classic little black dress. On the temporary side, post-war deflation motivated firms to retreat from standardization once Congress declined to continue the WIB's material conservation efforts. Yet permanent standardization reemerged as a product of determined political action at whose nexus sat Herbert Hoover. Hoover, an engineer and later US President, personified the intersection of public and private interest, albeit leaning toward the instrumental use of state power in the interest of business, and, in his opinion, the average worker. In 1921, Hoover used his position as president of the newly formed Federated American Engineer Societies to promote a Veblenian vision of an engineer-led society in which rising productivity permitted rising real wages and profits through lower production costs, what Charles Maier called the “politics of productivity.” Appointed as Commerce Secretary in 1922, Hoover revived the WIB's standardization policies in the guise of Commerce's opaquely named Division of Simplified Practice (DSP). The DSP worked with trade associations to collect detailed data on actual sales and then induce convergence around the handful of sizes comprising 80% of sales in any given industrial sector. While the DSP could not enforce standardization, Commerce used the Federal government's massive purchasing power to set standards for over 6600 goods. Standardization was thus one aspect of Hoover's vision of an ‘Associational State’ – the nascent American version of European Corporatism. Associations would link state and industry in pursuit of non-zero-sum economic outcomes via information exchange to the state and then state enforcement of behavior in industry's collective interests. Dunlavy's short book stints two things closely connected to her theme that deserve more elaboration: the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and America's missed date with corporatism. American standardization pre-dates the rise of mass manufacturing. The USDA (formed in 1862 versus Commerce in 1903) and similar state level bureaucracies expended considerable effort to standardize and grade US agricultural output in the second half of the 19th century. Select, Choice, Prime grades of meat anticipate Dunlavy's small, medium, large, and mattered in establishing the US as a quality food exporter after the 1860s. More relevant to political science is the limited discussion of the relationship between Hoover's promotion of standardization and the Associational State model, which could perhaps have helped answer the question “Why no Corporatism in America.” The 1920s and 1930s in Europe saw the rise and then postwar consolidation of corporatism as the modality for managing mass production, mass consumption and mass unionization. Still, Dunlavy's book usefully fills out the Fordism story. The author has nothing to report. The author declares no conflicts of interest. Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Historical Economic and Social Studies
Political and Economic history of UK and US
Political Economy and Marxism
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Regulation & Governance
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- e70151
- Publication date
- 29 March 2026
- Language
- EN