Madness as Strategy? Leader Reputation and the Logic of Elite Purges in Autocracies

ABSTRACT Objective Are leaders perceived as “mad” more likely to employ violent repression against elites? This article examines how a leader's reputation for madness shapes the use of violent military purges in authoritarian regimes. Methods Using a global dataset covering 110 countries from 1981 to 2005, we analyze whether perceived madness influences leaders’ decisions to violently remove military elites. Results The results show that a reputation for madness is positively associated with violent purges, even after accounting for political institutions, economic conditions, and leadership transitions. This effect is conditional and time‐sensitive. Leaders with military backgrounds are more likely to translate reputational signals of madness into violent purges, while longer tenure in office reduces the likelihood of such actions. Moreover, the effect of madness operates most strongly in the short term rather than accumulating over time. Overall, the findings suggest that madness functions as a strategic reputational signal shaping high‐cost coercive behavior rather than as a general predictor of elite turnover.