On the Formal Compatibility Between Ontic Emergence and Physicalism

Theoria 2026 Open access

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Authors: Francesco Maria Ferrari
DOI: 10.1111/theo.70066
Cited by: 1
References: 41

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper argues that Ontic Emergence (OE) and physicalism are formally compatible. I prove that the ‘from Closure ’ version of Kim's Supervenience Argument against OE is (trivially) valid only under specific but formally unjustified presuppositions. Hence, I prove that the argument is ultimately invalid. Finally, I emphasise that such formal presuppositions are equivalent to peculiar metaphysical tenets and, then, identify the minimal formal constraints that render monistic ontology a priori compatible with the naturalisation of OE.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophy and Theoretical Science Embodied and Extended Cognition Philosophy and History of Science

Publication details

Journal / source
Theoria
Publisher
Wiley
Volume
92
Issue
2
Publication date
8 February 2026
Language
EN