When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers
Abstract
In the combinatorial-action contract model (Dütting et al., FOCS’21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given set of actions. Each set of actions incurs a cost to the agent, given by a set function \(c\), and induces an expected reward to the principal, given by a set function \(f\). To incentivize the agent, the principal designs a contract that specifies the payment upon success, with the optimal contract being the one that maximizes the principal’s utility.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Auction Theory and Applications
Game Theory and Applications
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics eBooks
- Pages
- 6464–6493
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026
- Language
- EN