Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation
Abstract
Abstract. We study a stopping game of preemption type between two players who both act under uncertain competition. In this framework we introduce, and study the effect of, (i) asymmetry of payoffs, allowing, e.g., for different investment costs, and (ii) consolation, i.e., partial compensation to the forestalled stopper. In general, this setting does not offer an explicit equilibrium. Instead, we provide a general verification theorem, which we then use to explore various situations in which a solution can be constructed so that an equilibrium is obtained.
Fields of Study & Subjects
advanced mathematical theories
Publication details
- Journal / source
- SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1507–1521
- Publication date
- 27 May 2026
- Language
- EN