Categorical AI Phenomenology: A First-Person Approach

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Authors: Robert Prentner
Cited by: 0
References: 96

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Abstract

This paper develops a phenomenology-first approach to artificial consciousness by reframing consciousness as the subjective experience enacted through an agent’s interface with the world. We shift the methodological focus to first-person structures, modeled mathematically by categories derived from Q-networks to capture actions and phenomenological invariants. In this framework, Q-networks are conceptualized as relational interfaces encoding agent-world interaction, analogous to how the dynamical states of a computer depend on its sensory inputs, previous states, and actions. Our work provides a rigorous framework for interface consciousness to describe computational systems that embed information-processing into phenomenological structure. The approach aligns with 4E approaches to cognition by emphasizing enactive, embedded, and extended dimensions of experience. The paper thus offers a principled, relational, and phenomenological account of artificial phenomenology grounded in categorical mathematics.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophy and Theoretical Science Embodied and Extended Cognition Cybernetics and Technology in Society

Publication details

Journal / source
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
Volume
13
Issue
01
Pages
79–114
Publication date
1 March 2026
Language
EN