Anti-Phishing Training (Still) Does Not Work: A Reproduction of Phishing Training Inefficacy Grounded in the NIST Phish Scale

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Authors: Andrew T. Rozema, James C. Davis
Cited by: 3
References: 42

Abstract

Social engineering attacks delivered via email, commonly known as phishing, represent a persistent cybersecurity threat leading to significant organizational incidents and data breaches. Although many organizations train employees on phishing, often mandated by compliance requirements, the real-world effectiveness of this training remains debated. To contribute to evidence-based cybersecurity policy, we conducted a large-scale reproduction study (N = 12,511) at a US-based financial technology firm. Our experimental design refined prior work by comparing training modalities in operational environments, validating NIST's standardized phishing difficulty measurement, and introducing novel organizational-level temporal resilience metrics. Echoing prior work, training interventions showed no significant main effects on click rates (p=0.450) or reporting rates (p=0.417), with negligible effect sizes. However, we found that the NIST Phish Scale predicted user behavior, with click rates increasing from 7.0% for easy lures to 15.0% for hard lures. Our organizational-level resilience result was mixed: 36-55% of campaigns achieved "inoculation" patterns where reports preceded clicks, but training did not significantly improve organizational-level temporal protection. In summary, our results confirm the ineffectiveness of current phishing training approaches while offering a refined study design for future work.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Spam and Phishing Detection Information and Cyber Security Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies

Publication details

Journal / source
Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026
Publisher
ACM
Pages
3147–3158
Publication date
12 April 2026
Language
EN