Content and Access Networks Synergies: Tradeoffs in Public and Private Investments by Content Providers

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Authors: Pranay Agarwal, D. Manjunath
Cited by: 0
References: 2

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Abstract

The ever-increasing demand for better Internet experience has necessitated an upgrade in the capacity of access networks. Internet service providers (ISPs) have been demanding that the content providers (CPs) share the cost of upgrading network infrastructure. A CP can make a public investment towards improving the ISP infrastructure to boost its revenue. A CP can also make a private investment in its infrastructure and boost its profits. In this work, we consider multiple CPs and a neutral ISP. We consider different models of interaction among CPs—centralized allocation, non-cooperative game, and bargaining game—and study the trade-off between a public and private investment of a CP for each model. Via numerical results, we evaluate the impact of different incentive structures on the utility of the CPs. We see that the bargaining game can result in higher public investment than the non-cooperative and centralized models. However, this benefit gets reduced if the CPs are incentivized to invest in private infrastructure.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Caching and Content Delivery ICT Impact and Policies Network Traffic and Congestion Control

Publication details

Journal / source
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Volume
53
Issue
4
Pages
32–33
Publication date
31 March 2026
Language
EN